

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDA-12 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 DOE-15 SOE-02 OES-07 SP-02
PM-05 DODE-00 /102 W
-----094988 170408Z /12

R 160936Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3189
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 13902

USIAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR, PARM, IAEA
SUBJECT: MOROKHOV'S REMOVAL FROM CTB AND IAEA

1. EMBOFF TOOK THE OCCASION OF A CALL ON MFA
COUNSELOR BORIS KRASULIN ON ANOTHER TOPIC TO INQUIRE
ABOUT THE REASON FOR SCAE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN I. D.
MOROKHOV'S REMOVAL AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION
TO THE CTB TALKS AND ALSO AS THE SOVIET MEMBER OF
THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS. KRASULIN CLAIMED THAT
THE MOVES WERE STRICTLY INTERNAL ONES IN THE SCAE
AND ASSURED THAT THERE WERE NO IMPLICATIONS FOR
SOVIET POLICY IN EITHER AREA. HE SAID THAT SCAE
CHAIRMAN A. M. PETROSYANTS WISHED TO TAKE THE HELM
IN GENEVA AND THAT THIS MEANT THAT MOROKHOV, FIRST
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, WOULD HAVE TO DEVOTE FULL TIME TO
RUNNING THE STATE COMMITTEE. MOROKHOV WOULD NOT
BE RETURNING TO GENEVA. THESE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES
WERE EXTENSIVE ENOUGH TO REQUIRE THAT HE ALSO
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SURRENDER THE POSITION ON THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE IAEA, ACCORDING TO KRASULIN. I. G. MOROZOV,
ONE OF SEVERAL SCAE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, STEPPED INTO
THE IAEA GOVERNOR'S SEAT TO FILL THE VACANCY.
KRASULIN DECLINED TO SAY WHY PETROSYANTS FELT THE
NEED TO TAKE OVER THE CTB DELEGATION AND CONFINED
HIMSELF TO ASSURANCES THAT IT REPRESENTED NO CHANGE

IN SOVIET POLICY ON ANY MATTERS WHETHER SCAE, IAEA
OR CTB.

2. QUITE A DIFFERENT STORY OF THE CHANGES CAME FROM
V. A. VASIL'YEV, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF ATOMIC ENERGY
BILATERAL AT SCAE IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE SCI
COUNS. ACCORDING TO VASIL'YEV THE REMOVAL OF
MOROKHOV FROM THE IAEA AND CTB POSITIONS WAS DUE
TO ILLNESS. AGAIN WE WERE ASSURED THAT THE CHANGES
HAVE NO POLICY SIGNIFICANCE.

3. COMMENT: NEITHER OF THE ABOVE STORIES ABOUT
MOROKHOV'S REPLACEMENT IS VERY SATISFACTORY, ALL
THE MORE SO BECAUSE THEY ARE APPARENTLY CONTRA-
DICTORY. WE MIGHT HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THERE ARE NO
BASIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS TO THE MOVES, BUT THE
EXISTENCE OF TWO DIFFERENT STORIES ABOUT THE
CHANGES RAISES SUSPICIONS EVEN IN THOSE OF US WHO
ARE REGULARLY SUBJECTED TO SOVIET PREVARICATION
AND EQUIVOCATION (AND ON OCCASION OUTRIGHT LYING).
THE PROBLEM WITH KRASULIN'S STORY IS THAT SUCH
RESHUFFLING OF HIGH LEVEL SCAE OFFICIALS DOES NOT
SQUARE WITH THE ASSURANCE OF NO POLICY CHANGES.
AT A MINIMUM, IT SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE
DECIDED TO MOVE MORE RAPIDLY IN CTB AND WISH TO
HAVE THE MORE SENIOR OFFICIAL IN GENEVA TO HANDLE
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THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS STAGE. OTHER EXPLANATIONS
ARE ALSO POSSIBLE, HOWEVER. THE VASIL'YEV STORY
IS UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE UNLESS MOROKHOV'S
ILLNESS IS VERY SERIOUS AND LONG-TERM, THERE WOULD
BE NO REASON TO REMOVE HIM FROM THE IAEA POSITION,
EVEN THOUGH HE MIGHT SKIP A SESSION OF THE CTB.
ALSO, IF INDEED HE WERE SERIOUSLY ILL, KRASULIN
COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO USE THAT EXPLANATION.

4. WE WILL INQUIRE FURTHER HERE, BUT WITHOUT ANY
ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS. IF EITHER THE IAEA OR CTB
DELEGATIONS HAVE OCCASION TO MENTION THE TOPIC IN
CONVERSATION WITH THE SOVIET COUNTERPARTS, IT
MAY HELP EXPLAIN THE MATTER. OR IT MAY SIMPLY
ADD A THIRD OR FOURTH STORY TO THE LIST. MATLOCK

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PERSONNEL SEPARATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MOSCOW13902
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780253-0412
Format: TEL
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780650/aaaabrnc.tel
Line Count: 109
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: d4d05087-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 2
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2322837
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MOROKHOV'S REMOVAL FROM CTB AND IAEA
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, IAEA, (MOROKHOV, I D)
To: STATE USIAEA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d4d05087-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014